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"CitizenIv and vvcitizenshipM are powerful words. They speak 
of respect, of rights, of dignity. Consider the meaning and 
emotion packed into the French "citoyena* of 1789, a word that 
condemned tyranny and social hierarchy while affirming self- 
government and status equality; that was a moment when even women 
succeeded in claiming address as wcitoyenneu rather than as 
"madamen or mmademoiselle.M Since then the word appears often as 
a prefix to another term, always adding dignity to the original, 
as in ucitizen-soldier," wcitizen-worker,w wcitizen-mother.uv The 
word has so much dignity it rarely appears in slang. In a few 
informal phrases it continues to carry approval and respect, as 
in Iva citizen of the worldvv or a vvcitizensl committee. Iv We 'find 
no pejorative uses. It's a weighty, monumental, humanist word. 
It is telling, therefore, that Americans rarely speak of 
Itsocial citizenship." ,That expression, if used, wouid convey the 
idea that in a welfare state citizenship carries entitlements to 
social provision. It would bring social provision within the aura 
of dignity surrounding "citizenshipu and "rightsw. People who 
enjoy "social citizenshipw get vlsocial rights," not "handouts." 
This means not only that they enjoy guarantees of help in forms 
that maintain their status as full members of society entitled to 
I1equal respect.Iv It also means that they share a common set of 
institutions and services designed for all citizens, the use of 
which constitutes the practice of social citizenship: for 
example, public schools, public parks, universal social 
insurance, public health services. Thus, the expression "social 
citizenshipw evokes themes from three major traditions of 
political theory: liberal themes of (social) rights and equal 
respect; cornunitarian norns of solidarity and shared 
responsibility; and republican ideals of participation in public 
life (through use of "public goodsff and Ifpublic service^^^). 
But the expression is almost never heard in public debate in 
the U. S .  today. Here, social provision remains largely outside 
the aura of dignity surrounding @Icitizenship." Receipt of 
"welfareff is usually considered grounds for disrespect, a threat 
to, rather than a realization of, citizenship. Likewise, "public 
hospitalsN are institutions of last resort, sites not of 
solidarity but of stigma. Public schools, once considered 
acradles of citizenship," are often so inferior to their 
Ifprivatelf (commodified) counterparts as to fit the larger pattern 
of ffprivate wealth, public squalortfl and public parks are often 
too dangerous to enter. In general, the idea of lVsocial 
citizenship in a welfare staten is out of phase with powerful 
currents in contemporary American political culture. The 
connotations of ffcitizenshipaf are so positive, powerful, and 
proud, while those of lfwelfarefl are so negative, weak, and 
degraded, that "social citizenshipff here sounds almost 
oxymoronic. 
As "the unsaidff in contemporary American political culture, 
ffsocial citizenshiptf provides a critical lens for viewing some of 
e*. .m,= * 
the peculiarities of that culture. One of these, we argue below, 
is a tendency to focus on two, rather extreme, forms of human 
relationship: discrete contractual exchanges of equivalents, on 
the one hand, and unreciprocated, unilateral charity, on the 
other. In contrast, the expression "social citizenshipw points 
to another sort of relationship altogether. Its absence in the 
U.S. betokens--and strengthens--a cultural suppression of 
alternatives to the stark binary opposition, contract versus 
charity. 
The U. S. silence with respect to "social citizenshipn 
points to a second cultural difficulty we shall discuss below: a 
tendency to dissociate lgpolitical participationt1 and "social 
provision." Americans associate citizenship with "independence" 
and wparticipation,lg which carry connotations ofactivity. Public 
provision, in contrast, is cast as "dependence on welfare,I1 a 
mode of passivity, a mere getting or receiving, as opposed to a 
doing. Consequently, a conceptual chasm seems to separate 
.nparticipation" and glprovision,n and the connections between them 
are suppressed. In this context, activist, citizenly aspects of 
even the present organization of public provision are screened 
out; and possibilities for new, more participatory arrangements 
are obscured. 
For these reasons, the expression Itsocial citizenship1I 
provides some leverage for understanding, and perhaps even 
transforming, American political culture. It is not, however, 
without difficulties of its own. Not only does it presuppose the 
increasingly problematic unit of the nation-state--a difficulty 
we shall not discuss here--but, as we shall show, standard 
conceptions of social citizenship are pervaded by androcentrism 
and ethnocentrism, Thus our discussion proceeds simultaneously on 
two fronts, We use a concept derived largely from English 
sociological theory to critique American political culture, while 
at the same time, we use aspects of American history and culture 
to reveal some limitations of the English concept. 
Our touchstone is T. H. Marshall's brilliant 1949 essay, 
"Citizenship and Social Class," the source for all discussions of 
"social citizenship." Marshall was the first to conceptualize 
and defend social citizenship as the crowning stage in the 
historical development of modern citizenship. In his conception, 
it was the last of three stages. The first stage, civil 
citizenship, he held have been constructed primarily in the 
18th century and to have established the rights necessary for 
individual freedom: rights to property and personal liberty, and 
. . 
especially the right to justice. The second stage, political 
citizenship, was built primarily in the 19th century, in his 
view, and encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of 
political power, whether by holding office or by voting. The 
third and final stage, social citizenship, was constructed in the 
20th century; in Marshall's view, it not only encompassed rights 
to a modicum of economic security, but also entailed a more far- 
- 
reaching right l1to a share in the full social heritage and to 
live the life of a civilized being according to the standards 
prevailing in the society.lg (p. 78) 
Marshall wrote, of course, at a moment of hopefulness about 
social citizenship. The ~ritish electorate after World War I1 
ttungratefullyn overthrew Churchill and installed a Labour Party 
committed to building a welfare state. Marshall envisaged a 
state that would not only smooth the roughest edges off the sharp 
inequalities of class society, but erode class-based status 
differences altogether. He wrote of the importance of universal 
provision in creating equality of status and social solidarity: 
"Even when benefits are paid in cash, ... class fusion is 
outwardly expressed in the form of a new common experience. All 
learn what it means to have an insurance card...or to collect 
children's allowances or pensions from the'post office. But where 
the benefit takes the form of a service, the qualitative element 
[of shared experience and copuon status] enters into the benefit 
itself, and not only into the process by which it is obtained. 
The extension of such services can therefore have a profound 
effect on the qualitative aspects of social differentiation." 
(113) Marshall envisioned that universal educational and health 
services would eventually help dissolve divergent class cultures 
into a "unified civilization" by progressively decoupling real 
income from money income. He anticipated that the ttminimum 
standardtt established by public provision would in time be raised 
so high as to approach the maximum, so that the extras the rich 
could buy would be mere frills. The public service, not the 
purchased service, would become the norm. 
Marshallts utopianism did not derive from a simple Whiggish 
view of progress. On the contrary, he analyzed contradictions 
among the three evolving dimensions of citizenship as well as 
tensions among the citizens. He noted those excluded from 
citizenship and understood that citizenship itself had functioned 
as an architect of social inequality. He also grappled with the 
question of whether a uniform status of citizenship could be 
achieved while respecting the inviolability of market mechanisms 
and private property. He concluded, however, that the further 
development of social citizenship could renovate social relations 
toward greater equality. 
T. H. Marshall's essay is tonic reading in this period of 
widespread pessimism about public life, but it should not be 
appropriated uncritically. When questions about gender and race 
are put at the center of the inquiry, key elements of Marshall's 
analysis become problematic. His periodization of the three 
stages of citizenship, for example, fits the experience of white 
workingmen only, a minority of the population. His very 
conceptual distinctions between civil, political, and social 
citizenship presuppose'; rather than problematize, gender and 
racial hierarchy. Finally, his assumption, continued in later 
social-democratic thought and practice, that the chief aim of 
social citizenship is erosion of class inequality and protection 
from market forces slights other key axes of inequality and other 
mechanisms and arenas of domination. 
In what follows, we divide our discussion into two parts. 
In the first, we re-examine the relationship between civil 
citizenship and social citizenship, focusing on the historical 
construction of the opposition between contract and charity.. In 
the second, we reconsider the relationship between political 
citizenship and social citizenship, focussing on the historical 
construction of the dissociation of participation and provision. 
In both parts, we try to incorporate the perspectives of those 
who were originally excluded from citizenship, notably, white 
women and minority women and men. - 
Civil Citizenship and Social Citizenship: 
On the Opposition between Contract and Charity 
The first Itstage" of citizenship in Marshall's analysis-- 
civil citizenship--by no means spelled progress for all affected. 
Rather, in raising the status of some it simultaneously lowered 
that of others, since the understandings that informed civil 
citizenship helped construct modern forms of male dominance and 
white supremacy, as well as of class exploitation. Nor can the 
development of civil citizenship be understood in isolation from 
the question of entitlements to social provision. The new 
individual property rights frequently undercut older claims for 
community support. And they also supported a gendered, 
ideological opposition between contract and charity that still 
structures social provision today.1 
The earliest English meaning of tlcitizenship" was residence 
in a city. Since city dwellers were among the first groups to 
free themselves from feudal relations of servitude, the term also 
carried connotations of freedom. Marshall situated the first 
modern citizenship in early modern England, where by the 18th 
century servility had been legally abolished. nCitizenshipll at 
this time meant free status, and the rights attaching to that 
status were called "civicw or "civil rights." These included the 
right to own property and to make valid contracts, the right to 
sue in court, the liberty of one's person and, after the English 
Revolution, freedom of -speech, thought, and religious faith. 
The British pioneered a resonant justification of this form 
of citizenship, the theory of the social contract. In its 
liberal variant, this theory justified modern constitutional 
government by tracing the origin of political power to a 
voluntary, conventional agreement among free, rational 88menm in 
"the state of nature." The result of their "original pactN was 
government by law and, simultaneously, its other face: the legal 
constitution of a "civilm sphere within society in which 
independent individuals could contract freely with one another, 
secure in their persons and in their property. These individuals 
i 
thus acquired legal personalities and civil rights; they became 
I8citizensN of "civil society." 
The constitution of "civil society," both in contract theory 
and in contract law, was tantamount to a revolution in social 
ontology. The subjects of civil society were windividuals,8t 
conceived as prior to their relationships. Relationships, in 
turn, were cast as voluntary, temporary and limited arrangements 
entered into out of individual self-interest. The prototypical 
relationship was the contractual agreement, which consisted in an 
exchange of equivalents. This presupposed the liberty and 
independence of the contractors, neutral mechanisms to enforce 
their agreements, and individual property in the items exchanged, 
be they commodities, labor power, or opinions. In C. B. 
MacphersonOs memorable phrase, civil society was premised on a 
npossessive individualism." 
wPossessive individualismN was prototypically the basis of 
economic exchange, but its conceptual reach was far wider. It 
underlay the whole of modern civil society, itself broader than, 
albeit modelled on, commerce. The ability to enter freely into 
agreements or relationships of any kind presupposed freedom from 
subjection to a master, a condition that was imaged as self- 
ownership. tlIndividuals,n therefore, were proprietors not only of 
the tangible goods in their possession but of their "personsw as 
well. The guarantees of civil citizenship thus included not just 
economic property rights, including the right to sell onets labor 
power, but also rights to personal liberty--freedom from 
arbitrary imprisonment and from unreasonable search and seizure; 
liberty of movement and bodily integrity; freedom of speech, 
thought, and religion--and the right to sue in a court of law in 
order to enforce all one's other rights. 
Commonsensical as it is today, the new ontology of civil 
society represented a revolutionary departure from earlier views 
of personhood and social relations. Previous legal 
understandings did not recognize nindividuals" as bearing rights 
that were prior to, and independent of, their place in a status 
hierarchy. Nor did they construe social relations as freely 
chosen, limited agreements between parties of equal status. 
Rather, relationally defined statuses were prior to or 
contemporary with individuals and constitutive of their 
entitlements and obligations. Relationships, moreover, were 
characteristically quasi-permanent, nonvoluntary, hierarchical 
arrangements obligating subordinates to obey and superordinates 
to protect. This earlier ontology recognized masters and subjects 
but had no place for citizens. 
The modern construction of civil citizenship presented a 
fundamental challenge to traditional subjectship but not a 
wholesale replacement. On the contrary, not even the most 
radical early exponents of flcivil societym envisioned it as the 
whole of society. Nor did the most ardent defenders of the civil 
rights of individuals see all human beings as  individual^.^^ 
Rather civil society was viewed as but one subsector within 
society, standing in a complex, symbiotic relation to others. And 
the majority of people, including women, children, servants, and 
slaves, were not windividualsm with independent legal 
personalities. 
We can exemplify the apparent paradoxes here by considering 
two modern forms of subjection, coverture and slavery. That 
married women through the legal fiction of coverture were 
subsumed into the legal personalities of their husbands looks at 
first like a continuation of traditional subjectship, which is 
how T. H. Marshall apparently saw it. But coverture is better 
understood as a modern phenomenon that helped constitute civil 
citizenship. With the construction of civil society, married men 
who would have earlier been Ifdependentslf within larger 
patriarchal units became family lfheadsff and lfindividuals.fl 
Family headship thus became a newly salient and honorific status, 
rivalling rank, caste, and property ownership as a source of 
civil citizenship. By granting independent legal standing to all 
(white) male heads of families, coverture democratized relations 
among adult white men, for whom marriage conferred entree into 
civil society. Contrq Marshall's assumption, then, the exclusion 
of married women from civil citizenship was no mere archaic 
vestige that would fade as citizenship evolved. Rather, women's 
subsumption in coverture was the other face and enabling ground 
of modern civil citizenship. The two mutually defined one 
another. 
"' The same is true for the brutal new forms of slavery that 
emerged in the New World in tandem with the elaboration of civil 
citizenship. In the United States, for example, the world's most 
extensive civil rights for white men coexisted with history's 
most totalitarian, rights-depriving system of chattel slavery for 
Black men and women. The modern "scientific" concept of "racen 
justified the subjection of Blacks at the very moment when the 
discourse of "citizenshipgg proclaimed liberty the natural 
birthright of The centerpiece of civil citizenship in the 
"the white republicu was property right. In the slave states, 
free white men were wpersons,w while Black slaves were 
and civil citizenship guaranteed the property rights 
of the former in the latter. It is one of the great ironies in 
the history of civil citizenship that the first American Married 
Women's Property Act, passed in Mississippi in 1839, was aimed at 
securing slaveholdersf wives rights over slaves. (%Smith 1989%) 
Meanwhile, the citizenship claims of white male wage workers 
rested in part on their ability to earn, itself underpinned by 
their property in their own persons and in their labor power. But 
the status of "free laborBt found its meaning and honor largely in 
contrast to the degraded condition of the slave, who labored but 
did not earn. (%Shklar 1991%) Here, too, then, arrangements 
treated by Marshall as peripheral exceptions helped construct 
civil citizenship's meaning. 
Civil citizenship made property rights the model for all 
other rights, thereby encouraging people to translate all sorts 
of claims into property claims. It is not surprising, then, that 
those excluded from civil citizenship were usually those who did 
not own property, including those who were unable to get their 
resources defined as property, as well as those who were 
property. Conversely, some civil rights have been less valuable 
to the propertyless. Rights of heads of households against 
intruders and the state, for example, did not usually benefit 
women and slaves; rather these rights often deprived them of 
outside protection from abuse by their masters.2 
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of liberal contract theory, 
then, civil rights were not at first rights of 'individuals." 
Instead, they were paradigmatically rights of white male property 
owners and family heads, rooted in part in their responsibility 
for 'dependents.' I1Having dependents," in fact, became in some 
jurisdictions a qualification for full civil citizenship. The 
legal subsumption of wives in coverture, and the legal 
classification of slaves as property, therefore, were no simple 
matters of exclusion. They actually helped instead to define 
civil citizenship, for it was by protecting, subsuming, and even 
owning others that white male property owners and family heads 
became citizens. 
-.Marsha-11 is not quite right, .then, in viewing the 
construction of civil citizenship as simply an elevation in the 
status of those men whom it freed from the bonds of dependency. 
It also represented a comparative demotion in status for those 
women, men, and children who did not then acquire independent 
legal personalities. Previously, to lack civil "independencen 
had been the normal majority condition; it was not particularly 
stigmatized or demeaning. But when white married men, small 
freeholders, and family heads achieved independent legal status, 
subsumption into the legal personality of another became 
increasingly anomalous--and stigmatizing. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, both coverture and slavery had come to seem abhorrent to 
many people. Some white women and black slaves responded by 
appropriating the rhetoric of social contract theory and claiming 
to be  individual^.^^ But contrary to Marshall's view, they were 
not simply demanding admission to a pre-existing status. Rather, 
as-we shall see, they were challenging the entire social order 
structuring claims to social resources that enabled white male 
"independence. It 
The construction of modern civil citizenship also 
transformed the basis of entitlements to social resources and 
thus had implications for tfsocial welfare." In traditional, 
precapitalist societies, many claims to social resources were 
grounded in some variation of a "moral economy" that curbed 
individual self-interest. There was less absolute private 
property, for example, as ownership was usually a matter of 
divided, overlapping entitlements to various kinds of use. As a 
result,.most property was not entirely liquid, its disposition 
being constrained by tradition. Moral-economic understandings 
also constrained the conditions surrounding paid labor, removing 
it too from "freett market exchange. The remuneration, the content 
of the labor, who performed it and when--all were hedged in by a 
tradition that constrained all parties to the transaction. 
In this context, claims on social resources were based on a 
variety of relationships, and many entitlements to support 
derived from kinship. The traditional extended family encompassed 
.a set of relationships in which a wide range of kinfolk, and at 
times neighbors and villagers, had some economic responsibilities 
for each other. No single relationship defined anyone's whole 
entitlement to support, as particular relations overlapped one 
another to form longer chains of dependency and wider webs of 
responsibility. These arrangements were patriarchal, to be sure, 
but as such they differed markedly from coverture. Women figured 
as centrally, though without as much power, as men in the full 
range of kin-based relationships..Thus, far from depending 
exclusively on husbands, wives usually had a variety of different 
bases on which to claim needed resources. 
The rise of civil citizenship eroded these arrangements, in 
part by creating a new form of property right that trumped 
customary obligations and entitlements. When land became a 
commodity, rural populations lost their customary rights of 
tenancy and use. Later, llreformslt of traditional poor relief 
weakened customary entitlements to community support, 
facilitating the creation of a Itfree" market in labor--free, that 
is, from the moral-economic strictures of the Itjust wage." For 
the majority, consequently, the property right enshrined by civil 
citizenship spelled dispossession. 
It was just such new forms of property right and labor 
contract that T.!H. Marshall had in mind when he claimed that the 
rise of civil citizenship at first set back social citizenship, 
impacting negatively on the welfare of many. But he failed to 
r: -.. notice the gender and family meanings of civil citizenship, which 
-- - , .--*  were equally full of portent for welfare. The construction of 
- -- (white) men's citizenly entitlement as household heads 
- .  simultaneously created women's unique "dependencew on husbands. 
-- - -- Thus, civil citizenship helped create the norm of the family wage 
and undercut earlier, kin-based claims on social resources.3 
These arrangements signalled the contraction of kinship to 
one "spherew of society, a counterpoint to, and support for, 
"civil Whereas all social relations had earlier been 
formed from or modelled on kinship, kinship now became merely one 
social arena among others, and its cultural meaning altered. Now 
the "kinship spherew became the realm of "the domes ti^,^^ a 
"private spheren of familial intimacy and affect. (%Nicholson 
1986%) The result was the appearance of a sharp new disjuncture 
between two radically different kinds of claims to social 
provision, associated with two different "spheresI1 of society. In 
civil society, provision seemed to be organized via contract; 
resources were exchanged for exact equivalents in discrete, 
monetarized transactions between self-interested independent 
individuals. In the domestic sphere of the intimate family, in 
contrast, resources appeared to flow with sentiment wholly 
outside the circuit of exchange. 
Increasingly the disjuncture between the two "spheresgt came 
to be understood ideologically. Contractual exchange, the 
principle of civil society, became hegemonic and was increasingly 
viewed as the basic form of human interaction. Many 
noncommercial transactions were understood in these terms, as 
contract functioned as a metaphor for the presupposition of 
rational choice, in which the motive was self-advantage. For 
example, the same motive that supposedly defined the behavior of ' - 
consumers and sellers was invoked as defining political 
relations. And the contract metaphor reconstructed the meaning of 
paid labor as "wage labor," a supposedly free and equal 
contractual exchange of labor power for wages. 
As contract seemed to hold sway over a progressively larger 
share of human relations, the range of alternatives seemed to 
narrow. Noncontractual forms of reciprocity were increasingly 
assimilated to contractual exchange, and unilateral helping 
seemed the only alternative. Thus, the hegemony of contract 
created the modern conception of "charity" as its complementary 
other. Whereas contract connoted bilateral exchange, self- 
interest, rationality, and masculinity, charity took on 
contrasting connotations of unilateral gift-giving, altruism, 
sentiment, and femininity. The contrast, moreover, assumed the 
guise of a conceptually stable binary opposition that exhausted 
all conceivable possibilities. 
The binary opposition between contract and charity was 
ideological in at least two respects. First, in the modern 
conception of charity, the giver got moral credit while the taker 
was increasingly stigmatized. That distribution of value was 
inherently unstable, however, since the stigmatization of 
recipients naturally spawned doubts about the merits of giving. 
From at least the nineteenth century, such doubts fueled repeated 
waves of wreformll that sought to counter the "degenerativen 
effects of "indiscriminate givingf1 both on recipients and on 
society as a whole. Thus contract repeatedly menaced charity, and 
what had appeared to be a stable dichotomy was al.ways in danger 
of dissolving. 
Second, because the contract-versus-charity dichotomy seemed 
to deny the possibility of noncontractual reciprocity, it 
occluded the existence of a whole range of popular practices that 
defied the official categorization. Kinship and neighborly 
obligations continued strong, despite the ideology of the 
independent nuclear family; and informal mutual aid persisted in 
a variety of guises and forms. Yet these practices took on a 
more shadowy quality as they lost public legitimacy and 
recognition. In time, the lack of a language to validate their 
existence contributed to their decline and decay. 
Thus, the contract-versus-charity dichotomy increasingly 
remade reality in its image, crowding out other types of 
relations. It impressed its stamp strongly on state provision of 
welfare, which developed along dichotomous lines. In the United 
States, for example, government programs tended to bifurcate into 
two streams. Those with the most legitimacy took on some of the 
trappings of civil exchange, guaranteeing secure entitlements to 
some citizens by mimicking private contracts. Other programs, in 
contrast, were cast as proffering unreciprocated aid to the 
"innocentu and "deservingIg poor, with the state assuming the role 
of charitable benevolence. These two streams, moreover, were 
strongly gendered. The contract stream had its first U.S. 
prototype in "workmanfs compensationM (industrial accident 
insurance), while the charity stream was exemplified by Itwidowst 
pensions." 
The gender-coded contract-versus-charity dichotomy persists 
today in most countries in the opposition between "social 
insuranceft programs and "pubic assistance" programs. The first 
were designed by reformers to appear wcontributory," seemingly 
embodying the principle of exchange; thus recipients, originally 
intended to be male and relatively privileged members of the 
working class, are defined as "entitled."4 "Public assistance," 
in contrast, continued the nnoncontributoryn charity tradition, 
so that its recipients appear to get something for nothing and to 
remain outside contractual norms. 
That, at least, is the official appearance, but the reality 
is considerably more complicated. Numerous social insurance 
advocates of the early 20th century knowingly used the term 
ncontributoryn as a rhetorical selling device for the new 
programs, fully aware that all welfare programs are contributory, 
differing only as to where and how the contributions are 
collected, through taxes, wage deductions, etc. Moreover, 
despite their official image as contractual, U.S. Social Security 
"insurance" programs depart significantly from actuarial 
principles, and benefits do not actually reflect financial 
contributions. Furthermore, while the legitimacy of Social 
Security retirement pensions derives in part from the view that 
they compensate previous service, one might with equal 
plausibility claim that seemingly "nonc~ntributory~~ programs like 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, the successor to 
mother's pensions) compensate the childrearing wservicelt of 
single mothers.5 In any case, the contract-versus-charity 
dichotomy is less a true picture of the two tiers of American 
state provision than an ideology of their differential 
legitimacy, one premised on the privileging of waged labor and on 
the derogation of women's unpaid care work.6 
Not only did the construction of civil citizenship affect 
the design of welfare programs, but, conversely, the stratified, 
gendered construction of social welfare has affected the 
conditions of civil citizenship. Receipt of public assistance 
often meant curtailment of civil rights. For example, AFDC 
claimants in the U. S. have been denied the-right to interstate 
travel (abridged by state residency requirements); the right to 
due process (abridged by administrative procedures for 
determining eligibility and terminating benefits); the right to 
protection from unreasonable search and seizure (abridged by 
unannounced home visits); the right to privacy (abridged by 
"morals testing"); and the right to equal protection (abridged by 
all of the above). By contrast, receipt of "social insurancen 
entailed no comparable loss of civil rights. 
Significantly, in the 1960s and 70s, legal arguments aimed 
at securing recipientsf civil rights sought to establish that 
welfare benefits are not a "gratuity" or "promise of charity" but 
a form of "property.It These arguments were designed to conform to 
the reigning interpretation of the due process clause of the U. 
S. Constitution, which holds that its protections apply only to 
deprivations of property.7 In this interpretation and the 
surrounding arguments, the contract-versus-charity dichotomy is 
clear. Only by reclassifying public assistance as property and 
recasting recipients as independent contractors could their civil 
citizenship be maintained. Yet as some welfare rights activists 
noted at the time, these terms could not express a vision of full 
social citizenship. The arguments from welfare as property 
yielded some procedural safeguards, but they did not establish a 
substantive right to economic security in the form of an adequate 
grant. Although public assistance recipients won rights to due 
process, they won no right to be lifted out of poverty, let alone 
any right "to a share in the full social heritage and to live the 
life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing 
in the society."8 
In the contract-versus-charity dichotomy, contract is the 
more powerful pole. It is understandable, therefore, that 
reformers seeking to win social rights tried to move ltwelfaren 
from the charity to the property side of the line. They bent the 
property idiom to new purposes, but they ran up against the 
limits of a strategy that sought to model social provision after 
civil citizenship. That strategy was necessarily fraught with 
tensions, since civil citizenship is premised on either/or 
oppositions between gift and exchange, dependence and 
independence, while social citizenship points beyond these 
oppositions to solidarity and interdependence. 
More in line with the deep logic of these ideological 
oppositions is the recent attempt by U.S. neoconservatives to 
assimilate "welfaren to wcontract.v Their strategy is announced 
in Lawrence Meadts. influential 1986 book, Beyond Entitlement: The 
Social Obligations of Citizenship, which argues that citizenship 
is a two-sided. status conferring not only rights but 
responsibilities. Mead proposes to correct liberalst putative 
one-sided emphasis on welfare rights by introducing contracts in 
which welfare claimants must Itagree" to accept work, training, 
and/or other obligations in return for their grants, thereby 
entering the sphere of exchange. Yet he neglects to explain how 
the proposed transaction could be a valid contract--a voluntary, 
free agreement between independent individuals--when one party 
lacks the barest means of subsistence while the other is the U. 
S. government. 
The appeal of arguments like Mead's shows that the contract 
myth remains a difficulty for social provision today. Since the 
wage appears as an exchange in return for labor, it is argued 
that all resources should be apportioned interms of exchange. 
The fear that welfare I1chiselersl1 are getting I1something for 
nothing" becomes the embittered response of many who work hard 
and get little; their own paltry remuneration becomes their norm 
and they see themselves as cheated by welfare clients rather than 
by their employers. Such responses are only exacerbated, 
moreover, when the poor are constructed as racially filother.tl The 
result is that, with the threat of a major depression looming, 
the claims of the poor today are far weaker than they were in 
traditional societies, thanks to the contract-versus-charity 
dichotomy. 
In sum, civil citizenship stands in a tense, sometimes 
. 
contradictory relationship to. social citizenship. This is nowhere 
more true than in the United States, where civil citizenship 
remains inflected by notions of "contractw and "independence," 
while social provision has been constructed to connote "charityN1 
and "dependence." What is missing is a public language capable of 
expressing ideas that escape those dichotomous oppositions: 
especially the ideas of solidarity, noncontractual reciprocity, 
and interdependence that are central to any humane social 
citizenship. 
Political Citizenship and Social Citizenship: 
On the Relation between Participation and Provision 
Marshall saw political citizenship as a discrete concept and 
a determinate stage in the progress of civilization. He used the 
concept to refer to participation in policy-making and 
distinguished it from social citizenship, by which he meant 
entitlement to social provision. Such a separation of 
participation from provision is a standard feature of official 
political culture, especially in the United States. Yet 
historically systems of participation were never separable from 
systems of provision; and they developed in tandem, not 
sequentially. The two notions are conceptually related, moreover, 
since participation requires provision as a condition of its 
possibility; they only appear separable when both are reductively 
defined. 
In fact, the development of political citizenship cannot be 
understood in isolation from the question of entitlements to 
social resources. Nor without challenging the dominant but 
limited conceptions of "participationw and "provision" that 
Marshall presupposed. These conceptions, which derive fr0.m 
liberalism, reduce political citizenship to voting and provision 
to collecting government benefits. Consequently, they occlude 
other important forms of participation and provision: notably, 
the activisms of the disfranchised--in popular social movements, 
for example; and what is arguably the most universal form of 
social provision, the nonmarket labor of women. In addition, the 
dominant understandings in the United States often polarize 
participation'and provision, associating the former with 
"independencew and "activity," the latter with tldependencett and 
"passivity." They thereby inhibit the capacity to envision new 
forms of social citizenship that could integrate participation 
with provision. 
In what follows, we reconsider the relationship between 
these concepts, showing how Marshall's limited definitions of 
them led him to truncate and distort their history. We argue, 
first, that the qualifications for modern political citizenship 
were defined in ways that presupposed specific systems of social 
provision; second, that the democratization of modern political 
citizenship was not the simple quantitative extension of a fixed 
status but a series of uneven and bitterly resisted struggles 
over the content of the status, which seemed to threaten 
entrenched systems of provision; and third, that historical 
struggles for political citizenship were not always 
distinguishable from struggles for social citizenship. 
Throughout, we try to restore the suppressed connections between 
participation and provision, while reconstructing the process by 
which they came to appear dissociated from one another. 
We begin by recalling that political citizenship has usually 
comprised a smaller, more exclusive subset of the larger, but 
already exclusionary circle of civil citizenship. Political 
participation has typically, albeit reductively, been identified 
with voting and office-holding, activities viewed as prerogatives 
to be,conferred in accordance with "qualifications." Throughout 
most of modern European and American history, only a minority of 
those subject to the laws of any given state have been deemed 
deserving of these prerogatives. Those excluded have either been 
denied citizenship altogether or cast as "passive," as opposed to 
"active," citizens. 
When properly interpreted, legal qualifications for 
political citizenship constitute a veritable map of assumptions 
about social entitlement. Qualifications have varied with time 
and place, but most have been glossed in terms of "independen~e,~~ 
which has itself had different interpretations. "IndependenceH 
has minimally meant freedom from subjection to a master, a 
requirement that excluded slaves, servile peasants, and 
indentured servants. Yet that sort of independence has only 
rarely been considered sufficient. Additional, more stringent 
requirements have included heading a family or household, thus 
excluding wives, children, and servants. More stringent still is 
"economic independencem in the sense of property ownership, which 
excluded not only slaves and most women, but also white male wage 
laborers and tenant farmers. Finally, "independencem has also 
meant possession of a requisite set of mental, moral, and/or 
martial capacities, including rationality, public-spiritedness, 
and physical bravery. That sort of "independence" has been 
assumed to be constitutionally lacking in white women and in 
members , - of inferior races, in the' U.S. , for example, in Blacks, 
~ative Americans, and Chinese. 
All these meanings of "independencett simultaneously defined 
contrasting senses of "dependence," which constituted 
disqualifications for political citizenship. All were also 
inflected by constructions of gender, race, and class. Contra 
Marshall, those inflections were not attenuated but exacerbated 
with the construction of modern political citizenship. The more 
patriarchy and tyranny came under attack in, for example, 18th 
century France, England, and the U.S., the less ltdependentsl1 such 
as women, servants, and subordinated peoples seemed citizen-like. 
(%Kerber 1990%) The American Revolution radically strengthened 
the pejorative meanings of **dependency," emphasizing its 
powerlessness and removing its implications of mutuality. At the 
same time, as the designers of the republic mapped out its 
governance, they widely assumed that "independence1* was a 
prerequisite for political participation. Later this rationale 
was reversed: women could not be trusted as voters, 
antisuffragists argued, because men would herd them to the polls. 
(%Gundersen 1987%) And servants were too identified with their 
masters to act independently of them. 
In these cases, the "independence1# and "dependencell defining 
political citizenship formed a vicious circle. First, the 
discourse helped to normalize conditions that made certain 
categories of persons appear "dependent." Then, the resulting 
*ldependence** of those persons was invoked to disqualify them-from' 
opportunities which would have made "independencell* and hence 
political citizenship, possible. 
Underlying this circularity, however, was another, more 
embarrassing complication: The "independentsn were dependent on 
the I1dependentsw for the production of their political 
qualifications. Some v*democraticn theorists made this' explicit 
with respect to family headship. For example, Rousseau's l*tutorI1 
tells Emile, "when you become head of a family you are going to 
become a member of a state." (%Pateman 1985%) Likewise, Thomas 
Jefferson proposed that the suffrage be granted to family heads 
as well as to property owners on the grounds that a man's 
dependents, like his property, constituted his stake in the 
society, hence his qualification for political rights. Those 
proposals treated the subordination of some people, deemed 
undeserving of the vote, as grounds for enfranchising others. So 
did the rules apportioning electoral representation prior to the 
American Civil War, by which the numbers of slaves served to 
increase the weight of the votes of their masters. In both cases, 
the "dependents" constituted the qualifications of the 
"independents." 
In the preindustrial era, the same was true of the worker 
and the employer, but white workingmen eventually succeeded in 
overturning that arrangement. They won the suffrage in England by 
valorizing labor in a way that recast the relationship between 
Itparticipation" and wprovision.v They reinterpreted "economic 
independence" to mean above all ltbreadwinning,@v earning wages to 
maintain a household and support a dependent wife and children. 
Eventually, the. new ideal of "the family wage" underwrote the 
husband's political participation by pronouncing him the sole 
family "provider" and his "breadwinningl1 the sole qualifying 
labor. This new constellation of meanings obscured women's and 
children's contribution to the family economy. Thus, it 
simultaneously denied women's "provisionn and legitimized their 
"non-participation." Yet it was still the case that a wife's 
unrecognized labor supported her husband's political 
participation, and that he depended on her for the production of 
his qualifications. Thus, household production and nuclear family 
organization constituted, in essence, a system of provision that 
made possible male householdersf political participation. 
Moreover, the rise of modern political citizenship may 
actually have set back social entitlement, a possibility Marshall 
failed to consider. Inasmuch as it revalued "independence" and 
devalued "dependence," the culture surrounding modern political 
citizenship tended to lessen the sense of obligation to the needy 
and to undercut traditional modes of claiming help. Certainly, 
tensions increased between political participation, associated 
with "independence," and claims to public provision, associated 
with Itdependence." During the nineteenth century in the U. S., 
for example, the poor who were "dependentw on "public provisionw 
often forfeited political rights, just as they had in the English 
poor law tradition. (%Katz 1986; Abbott 1934; Brown 1940; 
Marshall 1950 ; Nelson 1990% ) Thus, shifting meanings of 
"participation! and wprovision, Itindependence" and 
"dependence," formed the.conceptua1 substructure of modern 
"political citizenshiptUt linking its history to that of social 
entitlement. 
Assumptions about provision not only saturated definitions 
of qualifications for political citizenship, they also underlay 
struggles over who qualified. That was nowhere more true than in 
the 18th-century United States, where republican influence was 
strong and the value accorded "participation" was high. The 
republican tradition associated citizenship with "material self- 
reliance.It It propounded an activist view of citizens1 
participation in government as requiring deliberative reason and 
public virtu, qualities deemed wanting in "dependentw white 
women and people of color. Republicans assumed, in addition, 
that republican government required the absence of factions or 
interest groups and a homogeneous citizenry. Together, these 
assumptions gave some support to a restrictive view of the 
franchise. And that view remained influential even after the 
development of a less strenuous, interest-oriented, liberal 
conception of politics, which reduced political participation to 
voting. 
Throughout their history, Americans have conducted a romance 
of the vote, some fighting great battles to prevent others from 
having it, others struggling mightily to win it for themselves. 
In these struggles the vote was not only an instrument for 
influencing policy in order to get what one wanted; it was also a 
matter of "standing ; of being "ing8 or ltout, lvabovelt or I1below. 
Enfranchisement in the U.S. meant not being a slave or a woman, 
an Indian or a Black. [%Shklar 1991%] Even some of the "outsu 
internalized this view. In the struggles surrounding the passage 
of the 15th amendment, for example, some white woman suffragists . 
. 
were enraged at the thought that Black men would be able to vote 
while white women would not. Every bit as racist as the men of 
their peer group, they could not endure to "standt1 beneath 
Blacks. 
The vote thus was a marker of distinction, and it-was 
employed precisely to maintain distinctions. Yet the 
distinctions at issue were usually rooted in systems of 
provision, which a limited franchise helped preserve. Thus, 
electors' (economic and emotional) investment in entrenched 
systems of provision frequently fueled intense resistance to 
enfranchising l1dependents.l1 Certainly, anxieties about provision 
were particularly vivid in the resistance to womenfs political 
citizenship.9 Anti-woman suffrage propaganda, for example, 
repeatedly featured images of women attending meetings rather 
than cooking, men forced to wear aprons, etc. Thus, the 
resistance derived not only from the fact that woman suffrage 
would force men to share political power but also from the 
perceived threat to the system of provision on which they 
depended. 
The intensity of the resistance to democratization has often 
been missed due to dominant but erroneous views, like Marshallfs, 
which posit a steady expansion of the franchise. In fact, the 
spread of political citizenship was highly uneven and bitterly 
contested, due largely to its inseparability from "the social 
question.I1 In the U.S., movements to roll back previous increases 
in the suffrage have been as strong and historically momentous as 
have been movements to further extend it. The most famous 
example, of course, is the disfranchisement of southern Blacks in 
the late 19th century by means of poll taxes, literacy and 
residency requirements, tlgood characteru1 tests and violent 
intimidation; this was a response to growing black economic 
power, aspirations for landownership, and threats to the 
sharecropping system. It was soon followed by a less well-known 
but major reduction of white workingmenfs voting in the north. 
Voting had peaked at the end of the 19th century when nearly 80% 
of those eligible actually went to the polls; but only males were 
generally eligible, and these voters were often controlled by the 
clientelism of political party machines. That system was 
challenged in the election of 1896 when populism threatened a 
strong third-party movement. The response of political elites 
and party leaders was a large-scale disfranchisement that reduced 
national voter turnout to 49% by 1924. They employed some of the 
same techniques used in the south as well as new ones: pre- 
election voter registration requirements that were 
disproportionately burdensome for the poor and the foreign-born. 
In addition, the governance of many cities was removed from the 
influence of voters altogether by the replacement of elected 
mayors and aldermen with appointed city managers or city 
-. -- commissions. By the time of the woman suffrage amendment, these 
%Y .. - - restrictions were all in place. They combined with many womenls 
. lack of comfort in actually existing (male) politics to produce a 
3- - turnout at the polls for white women that was at first even lower 
7- - than white menls. (%Piven and Cloward 1988%) The refranchisement 
T.- --- of southern Blacks had to wait for the struggles of the 1960s and 
remains incomplete to this day. In the early 1980s--after 
substantial Black refranchisement--U. S. voter turnout averaged 
53%. 
Contrary to Marshall, one can hardly describe this history 
as the progressive expansion of the franchise. Moreover, to the 
degree that the franchise did eventually widen, the effect and 
meaning of the gain was not merely a quantitative expansion of an 
entitlement whose meaning was fixed. It is misleading to see 
political citizenship, as Marshall did, as a fixed set of powers 
that are occasionally redistributed. Rather, the struggles over 
enfranchisement were also struggles over the forms and boundaries 
of political participation as such, especially in relation to 
social provision. At stake was not only the size and composition 
of the electorate but also what it was to have power over, hence 
a challenge to the liberal definition of the state. Most parties 
to the struggles over Black and woman suffrage thought that these 
democratizations could not be contained within the existing 
"democracy," that new "participationw would challenge old systems 
of "provision. 
Woman suffrage, for example, was not about adding some 
voters to the rolls but about ending the system of coverture that 
had defined the norms of modern gender relations. Thus, the 
resistance involved not merely men8s reluctance to share power, 
but a passionate defense of a whole social, cultural, and 
economic system. Conversely, the women8s campaign for the vote 
and against coverture was directly related to "social welfare." 
As we saw, a citizenship based on the political participation of 
male family heads had been premised on a system of "social 
provisionn in which nonfranchised women cared for children and 
men. The "political participationw of women required a 
substantially new system of "social provision." Feminists were 
asserting not only that coverture was unjust but, first and 
foremost, that it did not work, that women and children did not 
in fact get any satisfactory guarantee of personal well-being 
from that system. The relatively low rates of women's political 
office-holding today, seventy years after enfranchisement, reveal 
the impact of their continued responsibility for the care of 
others. For 0ver.a century now, U S feminists have been in the 
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forefront of the struggle for social citizenship, and even today 
the Itgender gapu is significant on welfare issues. 
Black enfranchisement also challenged prevailing 
distributions of social entitlements; the definition of 
emancipation, for African Americans, included 1140 acres and a 
mule.I1 The first national effort to raise freedpeople to 
citizenship, the Freedman's Bureau, was essentially the first 
federal welfare agency; its overthrow was the first step on the 
road to Black disfranchisement.10 Once denied the franchise, 
. . 
Blacks developed other forms of pol'itical activism, equally 
1. ' 
+..- . . . cdncerned with provision, and among Blacks, as among whites, - ,-.  b ' women disproportionately assumed responsibility for these 
" -, 
efforts , organizing schools, old age homes, orphanages, health 
. .  . 
care, kindergartens. The classic rendition .of early-20th century 
.- 
:i.. Black history as a struggle between the giants W. E. B. Du Bois 
-p. - and Booker T. Washington could be mapped onto the distinction 
between political citizenship and social citizenship, with Du 
Bois emphasizing the need to challenge racism and unequal 
treatment and Washington stressing "race-upliftM through self- 
help. Washington's approach rested on an assumption similar to 
Marshallls, namely, that citizenship comes in stages--first one 
kind of rights, then another; but he argued that social welfare 
must precede demands for legal and electoral equality. Du Boisls 
approach, in contrast, was to insist that Blacks could not 
advance socially and economically without civil and political 
equality. Yet recent historiography, especially that including 
Black women's public-sphere activism, tends to challenge the 
dichotomy, noting wide areas of overlap between the two aspects 
of Black activism. Race-uplift campaigners could not in fact 
avoid challenging segregation and legal subordination, while 
anti-discrimination activists always recognized the urgency of 
social welfare projects. (%Gordon 1991%) When both kinds of 
activism are located within the context of civil-rights thought, 
labelling the first uapoliticalw and wsocial,w and the second 
"asocialn and wpolitical,N seems artificial and misleading. 
Today, 130 years after the end of slavery, with Black poverty and 
its attendant damages at genocidal levels, it is abundantly clear 
that there can be no civil or political citizenship for African- 
Americans without social citizenship. Racial equality, like 
sexual equality, cannot be achieved within the terms of liberal 
or republican models of citizenship that divorce political 
participation from social provision. These limits were clear to 
Black leaders within a few decades after emancipation. Every 
civil rights struggle since then has included demands for 
affirmative government action within the meaning of social 
citizenship. 
Moreover, a proper understanding of the development of 
political citizenship requires rethinking what counts as 
political participation. We must decenter the vote in that 
definition as new social histories show us that, long before they 
could vote in the U. S., minority men and all women engaged in a 
variety of campaigns that considerably altered the political 
order. Consider, as a beginning, the impact of abolition 
agitation and the underground railroad. Disfranchised women, 
even while denied legal independence by the apparatus of 
coverture, organized powerful reform movements throughout the 
nineteenth century, influencing national policy in areas such as 
slavery, sexual regulation, welfare, family law, and childrenrs 
rights. For these women, the struggle for social citizenship 
.came before they won political citizenship. In fact, they cited 
their prior record of agitation for social provision as an 
argument for their enfranchisement and civil independence. Some 
historians have gone so far as to label the universe of discourse 
created by elite white activists a distinctive, coherent, 
ayternative female political culture. (%Baker; Sklar%) If this 
is true it was a political culture that foregrounded welfare 
- issues. And in this regard, Black women's 99political culturew 
was similar. Some have argued that white women's autonomous 
political power and effectiveness actually declined with 
enfranchisement, as they became more integrated into standard 
electoral activity. (%Freedman%) In any case, it would be 
difficult to make historical sense of a distinction that labelled 
9tapolitical" voteless women's agitation through the National 
Consumers' League for legislative regulation of working women's 
wages and hours, while labelling "political" the mobilization a 
few years later of franchised women for the Sheppard-Towner Act 
establishing maternal and infant health services. Just so it is 
unconvincing to label "apoliticaln such activities as a Black 
sorority's mobile health van which, in the 1930s, defied southern 
landlords by bringing health services to sharecroppers, while 
labelling upoliticaln women's voter registration work of the 
1960s. 
Even the historical experience of many white men does not 
fit Marshall's sequential model. Where do unions and related 
venues for working class male activism fit in his troika of 
citizenships? The conservative trade-unionist self-definition as 
normatively economic and apolitical was hardly the only 
perspective and prevailed only after great struggles. 
The history of such subordinated groups defies approaches, 
like Marshallts, that draw sharp distinctions between Itthe 
social" and "the political." Many historical actors did not 
think that the right to vote was distinct from the distribution 
of wealth. Political citizenship was not built via the 
progressive extension of rights whose meaning was fixed and 
independent of social welfare. Rather, political participation 
has always been closely connected to social provision in ways 
that are complex and often contradictory. As we saw, the 
participation of some rested on the provision of others; and the 
full participation of those "othersw required structural changes 
in the organization of provision. Thus, although it is true in 
principle that political rights can be used to secure social 
rights, social security has proved necessary in practice for the 
full and effective exercise of political power. Historical 
struggles for either one have usually also involved the other. 
Yet despite these connections, democratic movements in the 
United States never fully succeeded in integrating political 
citizenship and social citizenship, participation and provision. 
Certainly, the hegemonic American political culture does not 
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today see poverty as a deprivation of political rights, nor child 
care as an essential political right of women. Part of the reason 
is the continuing hegemony of gendered and racialized cultural 
meanings which value participation over provision. Political 
participation, associated with independence and activity, is 
still too often reduced to voting and separated from the help and 
interdependence that make it possible. Social provision, in 
contrast, is equated in the U. S. with "collecting welfareu and 
associated with dependence and passivity; or with low-status 
human-service work. As a result, the official political culture 
retains a blind spot both for extra-electoral participation and 
for the non-state, non-market provision that women so often 
supply 
Among the groups who have on occasion directly challenged 
the divorce of participation from provision are welfare 
recipients. Such a challenge was central to struggles of the 
National Welfare Rights Organization in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. The NWRO organized poor women who qualified for AFDC 
special allowances to apply en masse, as a political act. In so 
doing, they not only called national attention to the plight of 
poor women and children but also demonstrated that claiming 
benefits as a matter of right was itself a form of-democratic 
participation. Inspired perhaps by their example, political 
theorists like Barbara Nelson have recently argued that receipt 
of welfare should be reconceived as political participation. 
(%Nelson 1980%) And others have called attention to the amount 
of time, energy, and activity that is required to get on, and 
stay on, the rolls. Claiming is not just nreceivingll benefits, 
then, but citizen participation and work. 
Still, most Americans today view welfare recipients as 
passive takers, not active doers. And the welfare system itself 
tends to enforce that interpretation by a mode of administration 
that produces nclientsw as opposed to wcitizens.lt Thus, reality 
conspires to fulfill the conceptual divorce of participation from 
provision. The result is to perpetuate longstanding tensions 
between political citizenship and social citizenship, tension 
premised on interpretations that oppose independence to 
dependence, activity to passivity, participation to provision. 
What is missing is a language and a practice that can restore the 
suppressed connections, thereby helping us to envision new, more 
participatory arrangements for organizing provision. 
Conclusion 
[to follow] 
1 In this essay we use "social citizenship" to refer to 
Marshall's, and othersg, vision of an ideal "welfare state;" 
where we refer to actually existing welfare, we call it "social 
provision" or the like. 
2 Today there is such a critique of privacy rights; see 
MacKinnon. Nevertheless, many functional rights of women 
originated as protection of the property of their masters; this 
was the case, for example, of laws against (extra-marital) rape. 
3 That at least was the situation in theory. In fact, very few 
men actually earned a wage sufficient singlehandedly to support 
an economically dependent wife and children--so the paid and 
unpaid labor of wives and children was crucial to the family 
economy. 
4 Central to that construction, and to the entire opposition 
7 
-+.A - 
between contract and charity, is the hegemony of wage labor as 
the privileged basis of entitlement. This privilege is ironic, 
of course, since the view of the "wage labor'contractU1 as a free 
- agreement between independent individuals is a mystification. Yet 
that fiction supports the presumption that social insurance 
beneficiaries are independent contractors, hence full citizens of 
civil society. 
Some advocates of the early 20th century state "mothersf 
pensions" programs, the forerunners of AFDC, justified these 
programs as compensating motherhood, which they cast as.a valued 
service to society on a par with soldiering. Yet the pensions, 
like AFDC later, never supported motherhood per se but only 
sinale motherhood. Moreover, the compensation for service view 
was never institutionalized and it had largely disappeared by the 
time the state programs were federalized in the Social Security 
Act of 1935. By then wage labor had become so hegemonic that it 
and military service were the only bases of entitlement to 
provision other than abject need. See Ann Orloff paper and Theda 
Skocpol, Protecting Mothers and Soldiers (Harvard Univeristy 
Press, forthcoming). 
6 Moreover, there is also a third tier of provision, not even 
visible to the casual observer, that equally defies,the 
dichotomy. This is the whole range of occupational "fringe 
benefitsw and market-purchased pensions and insurance available 
to unionized workers, the salaried middle classes, and the 
wealthy. Usually considered nprivate,tl and thus quintessentially 
contract as opposed to charity, this provision enjoys a tax 
.exempt status that:amounts to a major government subsidy, one 
that could even be considered a llhandout. l1 But, it, too, appears 
legitimate because of its link to paid employment, the 
quintessential form of Ncontributionll in a male-dominated 
capitalist society. 
7 Reich, "The New Property,!' and "Beyond the New Property." 
Sparer, "The Right to Welfare." Other contributors to Brooklyn 
Law Review Symposium on the 20th anniversary of Goldberg v. Kelly 
(esp article by Sylvia Law). Majority opinion of the Supreme 
Court in Goldberg v. Kelly and Justice Blackts dissent. 
8 Sparer (1970) provides the most lucid and politically astute 
account of the achievements and limitations of the legal 
strategies pursued in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Reich 
(1990) and Simon (1990) describe the partial erosion of 
procedural safeguards as a result of court decisions of the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
9~fter the Civil War the 14th amendment to the U. S. Constitution 
codified a gender hierarchy which had existed informally since 
the establishment of the republic: while the first section of the 
amendment offered citizenship to "all persons born or naturalized 
in the United States," the section on the vote inserted the word 
.flmalem for the first time in the Constitution in order to decree 
that some citizens would vote and others would not. That 
amendment was written after three decades of womenfs-rights and 
abolitionist agitation had raised sensitivities to the point at 
.. " -. which it no longer seemed safe to use gender- and race-neutral 
.- 
b i . L  terms such as "personsw to mean white men. Even after the passage 
- 
fh. of-the woman suffrage amendment, women continued to have fewer 
- rights than white men; the rights they gained came piecemeal, 
*.- - . over centuries, by the layering of legislation on judicial 
decisions and vice-versa. When the struggle for woman suffrage 
is examined.in the context of other democratic movements, the 
length of time it took to win and the intensity of the resistance 
stand out dramatically; 
10 Feminists too were influenced by the role of the federal 
government in abolishing slavery and, like many civil rights 
activists, tended to look to the federal government tp help win 
female citizenship. See DuBois, 1990. 
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